



Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland
How Are Wages Determined?
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-T or economists, wage determination
seems to be like the weather: a popular
topic of conversation, but a subject that
inevitably remains open-ended. Part of
the reason for this lack of resolution is
that economists tend to think of the labor
market as a classical competitive market.
In that context, employers do not set
wages; instead, they passively pay the
wage that results from supply and de-
mand conditions in the labor market.
Seeing employers as price-takers, how-
ever, does not explain many of the ob-
served patterns of wages, such as wage
variation across industries for appar-
ently equivalent workers. Nor does it
explain why employers perceive them-
selves as choosing a wage within a mar-
ket-determined range of feasible wages,
and how they make that choice. Rather,
evidence suggests that viewing employ-
ers as wage-setters lends significant in-
sight into the wage-setting process.
Understanding wage determination is
the key to understanding important as-
pects of the economy, such as income
distribution, poverty, consumer spend-
ing, and the perpetuation of inflation. A
line of inquiry that expands our under-
standing of the wage-setting process
promises to provide insight into these
issues.
This Economic Commentary presents
some findings on the employer's role
in wage-setting. These findings are
based on observed wage patterns
among individual employers in three
labor markets in the Fourth Federal Re-
serve District: Cleveland, Cincinnati,
and Pittsburgh.
• Why Is It Important to
Understand the Wage-Setting
Process?
If employers are price-takers, who sim-
ply pay their employees a market-
determined wage, then an individual's
pay should depend almost entirely on
his or her characteristics (or human capi-
tal): education, age, IQ, and experience.
Even in the most detailed studies, how-
ever, these factors explain less than half
of the wage variation in the population.
Table 1 shows the limited explanatory
power of demographic information in
the Current Population Survey (CPS),
by listing how much of the variation in
wages is explained by four groupings
of variables.
1 The results are typical of
those found in household surveys.
In this sample, the usual human capital
variables (those included in group 1)
explain only a quarter of the variation
in the log of wages. Adding occupation
(as in group 2) raises explanatory
power by 16 percent, while including
other demographic variables (those in-
troduced in group 3—race, sex, and
union status) explains another 6 per-
cent. Finally, in group 4, the introduc-
tion of industry variables raises the ex-
planatory power to 51 percent of the
variation of wages.
What drives the half of wage variation
that all of these variables don't ex-
plain? Would an understanding of these
Much of the variation in wages
among employees cannot be ex-
plained by the usual variables of indi-
vidual worker characteristics,
demographics, and industry classifica-
tion. Based on evidence from three
labor markets in the Fourth Federal
Reserve District, the author finds that
employer differentials account for a
large share of the variation in wages,
with important implications for eco-
nomics and management.
unexplained wage patterns shed light
on the causes of movement in aggre-
gate wages?
For instance, the macroeconomic mod-
els that help us understand and predict
unemployment and inflation differ radi-
cally in their assumptions about the
wage-setting process. Classical Keynes-
ian models assume rigid or "sticky"
wages; companies do not adjust wages
downward. In contrast, most real busi-
ness cycle models assume immediate
adjustment of wages, but slow adjust-
ment of workers between jobs.
Fifty years after Keynes, we still don't
know in what way wages may be
sticky. For instance, are wage adjust-
ments mostly employee-specific, or em-
ployer-specific? When do wage adjust-
ments precede inflation, and for whom,
and when do they lag inflation? Do ag-
gregate wage changes primarily reflect
changes in the composition of employ-
ISSN 0428-1276ment or changes in wage rates to in-
cumbent workers?
The answers to these questions and to
many other related ones would be use-
ful to the business community as well
as to economists. Management has a
continuing interest in understanding
how its competitors in the labor market
set wages, and in the relative merits of
different approaches. At the same time,
insights into the wage-setting process
will enhance the ability of economists
to understand aggregate economic be-
havior, such as business cycles, infla-
tion, and income distribution.
Recent analysis suggests that much of
the unexplained variation in wages
among employees is linked to the char-
acteristics of their employers. Unfortu-
nately, most wage data come from
household surveys of wage-earners
(such as the U.S. Census and the CPS),
rather than from establishment surveys
of wage-paying employers, so they lack
any employer-specific information, ex-
cept for industry and sometimes em-
ployer size. To study the wages of em-
ployees, one must understand the role
of employers in wage-setting, which ne-
cessitates gathering wage data by em-
ployer and about the employer.
• How Much Do Wages Vary by
Employer?
To study wage variation by employer,
we use a data set that follows the
wages paid by a sample of employers
in three Fourth Federal Reserve Dis-
trict cities to employees in specific oc-
cupations from 1955 through 1988.
The data include observations on an av-
erage of 76 employers per year, each
for an average of 12 years, covering
about 24 occupations each. This longi-
tudinal file offers a unique opportunity
to study the wages paid by a panel of
employers over an extended period of
time.
One measure of the extent to which
wages vary by employer is the expected
wage difference between two random
workers in the same occupation, em-
ployed by different firms in the same
metropolitan area. On the basis of work
TABLE 1 TYPICAL CROSS-SECTIONAL WAGE REGRESSION






1 Years of Education, Age, Age-Squared .26
2 Years of Education, Age, Age-Squared,
Occupation .42
3 Years of Education, Age, Age-Squared,
Occupation, Race, Sex, Union Status .48
4 Years of Education, Age, Age-Squared,
Occupation, Race, Sex, Union Status, Industry .51
NOTE: Dependent variable was log (hourly earnings). Mean: 2.05, standard deviation: 0.55. Number of obser-
vations: 150,579.
SOURCE: Current Population Survey One-Quarter Earnings Sample, 1986. Sample includes all people em-
ployed in nonagricultural industries for wages and salaries, aged 18-54.
done at the Federal Reserve Bank of
Cleveland and by others, the expected
wage difference is 10 to 15 percent,
when averaged over all of the occupa-
tions in the firms. While the employer
differential received by some occupa-
tions may be slightly higher, and that re-
ceived by others may be lower, em-
ployer wage differentials are usually
remarkably uniform across occupations.
For example, choose a worker and then
choose another in the same occupation
but working for a different employer.
One of the workers will usually earn 10
to 15 percent more than the other. That's
the difference between $20,000 and
$22,000 or $23,000—or between
$40,000 and $44,000 or $46,000. The
magnitude of the differential is signifi-
cant: it is on the same order as the union
wage differential, which most employ-
ers and workers treat as substantial.
• Are Employer Wage Effects
Transitory?
These results would not be terribly
striking if wage differences among em-
ployers were short-lived. For instance,
suppose the lower-paid of the two
workers described above were offered
the opportunity to switch employers in
the next year (keeping the same occupa-
tion). Should she bother?
She should, if she knew that the wage
differential between the two jobs next
year is highly positively correlated with
the wage differential this year. On the
other hand, if these differences are ran-
dom (that is, if the correlation between
any two years is zero), then knowing
this year's differential gives no informa-
tion about what it will be next year. On
average, it doesn't matter if she
switches. Finally, she should definitely
stay at her current job if the firms bal-
ance off a relatively high wage this year
by paying a low salary the following
year. In this case, wage differentials are
negatively correlated over time.
In the sample of employers in Cleve-
land, Cincinnati, and Pittsburgh, the
correlation for company wage effects
one year apart is strikingly high: 0.91.
This number is close to 1, the number
obtained if these wage differentials
were absolutely permanent over time.
So, she should switch employers.
Suppose she were offered the chance to
switch in two or three or four years;
should she? That depends on the corre-
lations of company wage effects two,
three, or four years apart. Figure 1
shows changes in the persistence of
company wage differentials from the
city average over time. The horizontal
scale shows the number of years apart
for which the persistence is calculated.The vertical scale measures persistence
(correlation over time), which ranges
from -1 (if employers offset wage dif-
ferences over time), through 0 (random
changes), to 1 (perfectly constant).
In the figure, persistence starts at 1,
goes down to 0.91 after one year, de-
clines to 0.6 after 12 years, then drifts
down more slowly over the next 20
years, ending around 0.5, still signifi-
cantly above 0.
With the persistence of employer wage
effects over 33 years still in the neigh-
borhood of 0.5, employees could
rationally base today's decision about
switching companies on the basis of in-
formation that was three decades old!
Or, from another perspective, much of
the company wage differential received
by a worker when she first starts with a
company will be received each year
over the span of a 33-year career.
The strong persistence of these com-
pany wage effects suggests that they
must be based on fundamental charac-
teristics of the firm, and at the same
time rules out temporary error as a
major source of such variation. Never-
theless, persistence over time is not per-
fect, raising the following question: to
what do company wage differentials
actually respond?
• Why Do Wages Vary Among
Employers?
Employer wage effects are linked to
measurable characteristics of employ-
ers, such as industry, size, union status,
technology, and product. However,
knowing that such links exist still does
not explain the basis of employer wage
differentials. Instead, these links and
the findings discussed above invite fur-
ther speculation and research into the
possible sources of such wage varia-
tion.
The five possible candidates and some
of their policy implications are dis-
cussed in an article in a recent Federal
Reserve Bank of Cleveland Economic
Review^ Each model explains not
only why an employer would want to
deviate from a market mean wage, but
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SOURCE: Author's calculations from the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland Community Salary Survey,
1955-1988.
also what (usually a productivity differ-
ence) allows the deviation to be sus-
tained over a long period. They can be
summarized as follows.
(1) Employers systematically sort
workers by ability. This would imply
that the highest-wage employers in our
sample have the most able workers in
all occupations.
(2) Wages vary because of compensat-
ing differentials for different conditions
of employment. So, these high-wage
employers may provide little job secu-
rity, poor working conditions, or few
fringe benefits.
(3) Costly information generates or per-
petuates random variations in wages.
Wage variations are mistakes on the
part of some of these employers; they
misjudge conditions in their labor mar-
ket.
(4) Wage payments above the market
rate may be cost-efficient for some em-
ployers (of a particular technology or
size, for example) because of savings
on supervision, turnover, or other fac-
tors. Some of these companies count
on the fact that workers who know that
they have a high-wage job are less
likely to quit the job, or to risk losing it
by shirking or being careless.
(5) Finally, workers inside firms are
sometimes able to claim some of the
profits generated by firms in imper-
fectly competitive markets. Some of
the high-profit companies implicitly
share some of their profits with their
workers.
As suggested above, the size and persis-
tence of employer differentials effec-
tively eliminates random variations
(explanation 3). Other research on
compensating differentials and fringe
benefits suggests that usually, except in
occupations where risk of death is a
factor, high wages are associated with
better working conditions and fringes,
especially across firms. This evidence
makes explanation 2 less than convinc-
ing; the occupations surveyed here are
not subject to much variation in the
risk of death or injury.
Attempts to look for evidence of sort-
ing by human capital (explanation 1)
and efficiency wages (explanation 4)
have met with mixed success, and are
hampered by the lack of good informa-
tion on worker productivity and effort.
Profit-sharing (explanation 5) remains
an intriguing possibility, all the moreso because it may be more amenable to
testing than the others. Some authors
have presented preliminary tests sup-
porting this hypothesis, but the results
are inconclusive as yet.
• Conclusion
What does the importance of employer
characteristics mean? It suggests that
employers are not passive price-takers
in the labor market. Within bounds im-
posed by the labor market, employers
can and do set wages for their employ-
ees, presumably in order to enhance
worker productivity and to improve
their profits.
Of course, this evidence does not argue
that employer characteristics explain all
of the variation in wages, or that educa-
tion and experience have no effect on
wages. But it does imply an important
role for personnel policy that has many
implications for economics and manage-
ment. For example, employers may be
able to compete more effectively if they
improve their understanding of the ac-
tivities of their competitors in the labor
market. And, a deeper understanding of
wage inflation and business cycles will
need to incorporate the role of labor
market institutions and personnel poli-
cies in wage determination.
• Footnotes
1. The Department of Labor's Bureau of
Labor Statistics conducts the monthly Cur-
rent Population Survey of more than 50,000
U.S. households in order to measure national
labor-force activity. This survey is widely
used in empirical labor economics research.
2. See Erica L. Groshen, "Sources of Wage
Dispersion: The Contribution of Inter-
employer Wage Differentials Within Indus-
try," Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland
Working Paper 8802, June 1988; "Do Wage
Differences Among Employers Last?" Fed-
eral Reserve Bank of Cleveland Working
Paper 8906, June 1989; and "Rent Capture,
Ability-to-Pay and Salaries in the Private
Sector," Proceedings of the Forty-Second An-
nual Meeting of the Industrial Relations Re-
search Association, Madison, Wisconsin,
1990 (forthcoming). See also Jonathan S.
Leonard, "Wage Structure and Dynamics in
the Electronics Industry," Industrial Rela-
tions, vol. 28 (spring 1989), pp. 251-75.
3. See Groshen, "Do Wage Differences
Among Employers Last?" for the persistence
of employer wage differentials over six years
in a Bureau of Labor Statistics Area Wage
Survey. Leonard, "Wage Structure and Dy-
namics," looks at persistence in a private
wage survey of high-tech employers in Cali-
fornia.
4. See Groshen, "Sources of Wage Disper-
sion."
5. See Erica L. Groshen, "Why Do Wages
Vary Among Employers?" Federal Reserve
Bank of Cleveland Economic Review, 1988
Quarter 1.
6. See Groshen, "Rent Capture, Ability-to-
Pay, and Salaries"; Leonard, "Wage Struc-
ture and Dynamics"; and David Blanch-
flower, Andrew Oswald, and Mario Garrett,
"Insider Power in Wage Determination,"
National Bureau of Economic Research
Working Paper 3179, November 1989.
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